In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-1127 and 98-1128

REX SLANE,

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

v.

MARIAH BOATS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.



Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 94-C-4241--J. Phil Gilbert, Chief Judge.


Argued September 22, 1998--Decided January 11, 1999



 Before BAUER, MANION, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge.  Rex Slane, a diabetic,
worked in the upholstery department at Mariah
Boats, Inc. from 1992 until June 1994, when
Mariah fired him for refusing to take a drug test
(at least that's what Mariah said). Under
Mariah's "Drug- and Alcohol-Free Workplace
Policy," which started in January of 1994, an
employee who refuses to take a drug test is fired
immediately unless he certifies his refusal in
writing at the time he is asked to take the test
and provides a valid medical reason (we assume
promptly) for refusing to be tested. Mariah
tested its employees on random and "reasonable
suspicion" bases, both designed to surprise
employees. Mariah hired a third-party
administrator, National Safety Alliance, to test
employees and report the results.

 On June 8, 1994, two employees reported seeing
Slane in the bathroom with white power under his
nose. The company took no immediate action to
confirm whether Slane was using drugs or to
remove Slane from his job, where he handled
knives, scissors, and a powerful stapler. Eight
days later, however, the company asked Slane to
take a drug test. Slane apparently agreed but
then got sick, either from a diabetic attack or
from heat exhaustion triggered by hot
temperatures--there was evidence that it was over
80 degrees--in the factory that day. Slane was
taken to a nearby hospital, where he was
admitted. NSA tried to conduct the drug test
despite Slane's illness but was unable to do so.
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to
why NSA was unable to test Slane. Mariah
presented evidence that Slane refused to take the
test; Slane introduced evidence that he was
physically unable to take the test. But in either
case, the evidence clearly showed that NSA told
Mariah Slane refused to be tested and Mariah then
fired Slane. Slane eventually took the test the
next day and passed. But by then the company had
already fired him.

 Slane sued Mariah claiming it fired him to avoid
having to give him health benefits in violation
of ERISA. Slane also claimed Mariah fired him in
retaliation because he exercised his rights under
the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Slane
later filed another complaint claiming Mariah
fired him because of his diabetes in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court
consolidated the two complaints.

 Before Slane filed his second complaint, Mariah
moved for summary judgment on the ERISA count,
arguing that it fired Slane for a legitimate
reason: refusal to take a drug test. Mariah also
moved for dismissal of Slane's IWCA claims,
arguing that without the ERISA claim the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the IWCA dispute. The
court ruled on the motion after Slane filed the
ADA claim and therefore denied the motion with
respect to the IWCA claims (because the ADA claim
provided a basis for supplemental jurisdiction).
But the court granted the motion with respect to
the ERISA claim, finding that Mariah had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing
Slane and Slane failed to offer evidence that
Mariah's stated reason was a pretext to cover an
alleged discriminatory motive.

 Mariah later filed a second motion for summary
judgment on the ADA claim. For purposes of this
motion, Mariah conceded that Slane stated a prima
facie claim of discrimination under the ADA but
argued that Slane's inability to show pretext
should have entitled Mariah to judgment on the
ADA claim, just as it had on the ERISA claim.
Mariah asked the court to dismiss the IWCA claims
for the same reason. This time, Slane offered
additional evidence to support his theory that
Mariah's stated reason for firing him was pretext
and, because of that evidence, the court denied
Mariah's motion in its entirety.

 The case was tried to a jury and, after Slane
presented his case-in-chief, Mariah moved for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing for the
first time that Slane failed to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination under the ADA. The
court agreed and snatched the ADA claim from the
jury. After the close of all the evidence, Mariah
moved for judgment as a matter of law on the IWCA
claims, still pushing its theory that Slane
failed to show pretext. The court denied that
motion and sent the IWCA claims to the jury,
which awarded Slane $100,000 in back pay and
compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive
damages.

 After the verdict, Mariah again moved for
judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively,
Mariah moved for a new trial or remittitur,
arguing that the evidence did not support the
jury's verdict and that the award was excessive,
the result of passion and prejudice. The court
denied the motion. Slane moved for costs and, in
response, so did Mariah. The court found Slane to
be the prevailing party and awarded him
$5,157.42. Mariah's motion for costs, of course,
was denied.

 The parties filed cross-appeals, claiming error
in virtually every single pre- and post-trial
ruling by the district court. Mariah also
challenges the jury's verdict and the court's
decision to award costs to Slane. Slane's counsel
conceded at oral argument that he appealed only
to salvage some basis for damages in the event we
overturn the jury's damages award on the IWCA
claims. Because we are upholding the award, we
will not discuss Slane's arguments on appeal
except to say that they lack merit. Nor will we
discuss point by point each of Mariah's
challenges to the proceedings below. Mariah,
subscribing to the shotgun theory of appellate
practice, argues that all of the court's rulings
below should be reversed. Mariah's arguments
about how the court handled its first and second
summary judgment motions and its original and
renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law
all sound pretty much the same: the court was
wrong to rule in Slane's favor because Slane
failed to offer evidence showing Mariah's stated
reason for firing Slane was a pretext to disguise
its discriminatory motive. As we explain below,
Slane did offer such evidence. Indeed, the
testimony of Mariah's own employees provided
enough for the jury to conclude that Mariah was
lying when it said it fired Slane because he
refused to take a drug test. Thus Mariah's multi-
pronged attack in this regard must fail. We
discuss below Mariah's remaining arguments: (1)
that it should be given a new trial because the
jury's verdict and award were contrary to the
evidence and excessive; and (2) that the court
abused its discretion in awarding costs to Slane.

 The district court denied Mariah's motion for
new trial and Mariah appeals, raising the same
arguments on appeal as it did below--namely, that
the verdict was not supported by the evidence,
that the award was excessive and that it reflects
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.
Our review of the district court's denial of
Mariah's motion is deferential; we will reverse
only under exceptional circumstances showing a
clear abuse of discretion. Riemer v. Illinois
Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir.
1998); Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827,
835 (7th Cir. 1989).

 The court may award a new trial if the verdict
is not rationally connected to the evidence, if
it is born out of passion and prejudice, or if it
is monstrously excessive. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Regional Transp. Auth.,
125 F.3d 420, 437 (7th Cir. 1997). The district
court applied this standard and concluded that
the verdict and award were consistent with the
evidence. We agree. The jury heard evidence that
it was hotter than 80 degrees in the factory on
the day Slane was asked to submit to the drug
test; that Slane suffered heat-related symptoms
on the job; that Guy Coons (Mariah's human
resources director and the author and
administrator of Mariah's Drug- and Alcohol-Free
Workplace Policy) knew Slane was suffering heat-
related symptoms; that Coons knew any increase in
health benefits claims would cause the company's
insurance premiums to go up; that Coons fired
Slane the very day he was admitted to the
hospital; that the company had enforced its drug
policy inconsistently; and that Coons
deliberately refrained from investigating whether
Slane had actually refused to take the drug test.
All of this evidence supports the jury's verdict.

 The fact that Mariah presented evidence that is
inconsistent with the jury's verdict does not
mean the verdict should be reversed. In denying
Mariah's new trial motion the district court
noted that this was a close case with sufficient
evidence on both sides to support a verdict for
either party. No doubt that is frustrating for
Mariah. But the district court had to defer to
the jury's verdict and so must we. See Riemer,
148 F.3d at 806 (we are "particularly careful in
discrimination cases to avoid supplanting our
view of the credibility of the evidence for that
of both the jury (in its verdict) and the judge
(in not interfering with the verdict")).

 Similarly, the damages award was consistent with
the evidence. The jury awarded Slane $50,000 in
back pay and benefits, $50,000 in compensatory
damages, and $125,000 in punitive damages. The
damages award reflected rational consideration of
the evidence, and we will not second guess the
jury's decision. The evidence also supported the
jury's punitive damages award. The evidence,
viewed favorably in support of the verdict,
showed that Mariah's conduct was heartless--it
fired an employee while he was lying in the
hospital and refused to reconsider that decision
even after a doctor explained that Slane was
physically unable to take the requested drug
test. Coons admitted that he failed to
investigate Slane's refusal to take the drug test
and that he fired Slane even before NSA confirmed
Slane's refusal. Coons and Jimmy Fulks, Mariah's
president, testified that they didn't test Slane
immediately after learning he was using drugs in
the company's bathroom because they wanted to
"give Slane the benefit of the doubt." Yet they
refused to give any consideration to his doctor's
statement explaining that he was unable to take
the drug test, and they refused to reconsider
their firing decision even after Slane explained
the situation. As it did in the district court,
Mariah points to the evidence it presented to
contradict Slane's evidence. But the jury heard
all of that evidence and apparently decided to
give greater weight to Slane's view of the case.
It was up to the jury to decide what view of the
evidence was more palatable.

 The finding that the verdict was supported by
the evidence also disposes of Mariah's passion
and prejudice claim. See Dresser Indus. Inc. v.
Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1449 (7th Cir. 1992)
("a finding that damages were not monstrously
excessive or unsupported by the evidence
necessarily precludes a finding of passion and
prejudice").

 Finally, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding costs to Slane. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) "costs
other than attorney's fees shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs." Mariah argues that the court
erred in awarding costs to Slane because Slane
did not "prevail" in the suit; rather, Slane won
two claims and Mariah won two. The district court
correctly noted that when one party gets
substantial relief it "prevails" even if it
doesn't win on every claim. First Commodity
Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766
F.2d 1007, 1014 (7th Cir. 1985). Slane got
$225,000 from the jury. By any definition, he won
the battle. The court's conclusion that Slane
prevailed was more than reasonable.

 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.



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